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Abstract 
This work-project complements the existing studies on the linkage between financial 
investments returns and the political cycles, by relating Treasury bond returns and 
Presidential cycles. Previous research shows that stock market tends to behave better 
during Democratic presidencies, and in this work it is shown a compatible result, with 
long-term Treasury bonds having higher absolute, and excess returns during Republican  
Administrations. This difference is not explained by business cycles and there are no 
significant differences in risk, as measured by the volatility of returns, between the two 
political cycles. Empirical evidence is also found showing that there are better economic 
and financial conditions to invest in T-bonds' markets during Republican than during 
Democratic Administrations. 
 




TREASURY BOND RETURNS AND U.S. POLITICAL CYCLES 
I - Introduction  
This work-project provides evidence about the relationship between the Treasury 
bond returns and the political cycles in the United States. The influence of political and 
Presidential cycles in the capital markets returns is a considerable aspect since both 
Republicans and Democrats have different ideas and pursue different policies. These 
differences affect directly the financial market returns, not only by different economic 
and financial measures but also with different law revisions. On the other hand, there 
can also be other line of thought, in which policies followed by Presidents are not so 
different, and when elected, the President and the majority in power will have the 
tendency to adopt strategies and measures that might help a future re-election, and so 
financial returns should be totally independent from political variables. Despite this last 
hypothesis, Treasury bond returns are largely connected with the monetary and fiscal 
policies adopted by Governments, because they directly influence interest rates, and 
consequently bond markets. The differences between the two ideologies are known, 
whereas Democratic Administrations are expected to follow expansionary policies with 
more public sector intervention and employment stimulation, alternatively, Republican 
Administrations normally pursue the lowering of taxes, interest rates and inflation. So, 
these different approaches should have a direct impact in public expenditures, public 
debt level, Gross Domestic Product, inflation and interest rates level that ultimately 
influence Treasury bond returns. The purpose of this study, as stated before, is to 
analyze empirically the differences in political cycles of returns and from that 
extrapolate what are the “best” regimes for investors to increase the weight of 
Government bonds in their portfolio allocations.                                                                                                    
4 
 
The economic environment that offers better conditions to invest in Bonds,  is 
generally the economic state with low inflation and low interest rates, because it lowers 
the opportunity cost of investing in bonds, making coupon payments more attractive 
relatively to interest rate remunerations. Historically, in the 20
th
 Century, there were 
periods in which the conditions were favorable to invest in bonds,  like the last 20 years 
of the last century, and the beginning of the 2000’s, with low interest rates and low 
inflation. On the contrary, since the end of the World War II and the beginning of 
1980’s there were periods with high inflation, and with high interest rates with 
instability in debt markets, creating then a bear market for fixed income investments. 
Long-term bonds are important and are held by investors mainly for two reasons: they 
are good instruments to assume long-term hedging positions, and also this type of 
bonds, normally, has a premium over short-term investments, and this premium can be 
used for speculative motives.  
This work is organized as follow, firstly it is presented the literature review with 
the description of similar findings by previous research, afterwards data and 
methodology description with explanation of main results. The results are then 
compared with tests in subsamples using additional robustness statistical tests. It is also 
analyzed whether the excess returns differences are due to different risk assumed in the 
two cycles. This will be accessed estimating the volatilities of returns in the two parties’ 
cycles. Finally, some limitations of the work-project are presented, as well as alternative 
methodologies, and further research topics.   
Literature Review 
 There are not many studies showing the relationship between bond returns and 
political cycles. However, the relationship of stock returns and Presidency cycles is 
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widely approached in different papers, like Hensel and Ziemba (1995) who study the 
returns between small and big caps during both administrations, finding that during 
Democrats, indifferently of cap size, stock returns are significantly higher.  In a more 
recent study performed  by Santa Clara and Valkanov (2003), the authors reach similar 
conclusions. Using CRSP value weighted index returns as proxy for monthly stock 
market returns, from 1929 to 1998, they find that during Democrat Administrations, 
excess returns on the stock market are much higher compared with Republicans. 
Interestingly they also find that the risk is higher during Republican cycles, so the excess 
return is not a compensation for higher risk, constituting in this way a puzzle. From a 
macroeconomic point of a view, and using similar methodology, Elliot (2006), in his 
working-paper finds that from 1949 to 2005 real GDP growth is 5,1 percent in average 
during Democratic Administrations, which is more than the double from Republicans 
1,9 percent. For real GDP per capita the results are similar. He also tested whether the 
effect of Congress was higher on GDP compared with the effect of Presidential 
Administrations, because it is the Congress that decides on law material and approves 
the Government budgets. The impact of Congress in GDP was not statistically different 
from zero, so he concludes that the party in the Administration works as a better 
explanatory variable for political cycles. From all, the most recent study is from 
Ramchander Simpson and Webb (2008), in which they demonstrate the relationship of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) returns and political cycles. Contrary to the 
previous results on the above cited papers, the authors find that the REIT excess returns 
are much higher during Republican presidencies. The result is still significant when they 
control for the monetary policy, using for control a dummy variable defining the 
expansionary or loosening monetary policy, depending on the FED decision of lowering 
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or increasing interest rates. They also conclude that the evolution of these returns is 
much higher during the two last mandate years specially for Republican mandates. The 
importance of political gridlock, defined as the control of the majority of Congress, 
Senate and Presidency is also studied, and the authors find that political gridlock 
controlled by the same party helps the REIT returns, being these returns higher again 
during Republican leaderships in all parts of the gridlock, independent from tightening 
or loosening monetary policy. Wrapping up, all these papers present recent studies on 
the relation of political variables with the economic and financial conditions. The goal 
of this study is to complement the research presented, using different financial returns, 
but with similar methodology, testing also the inferred conclusions, while adding more 
updated results. 
II - Data and Methodology 
To examine the difference between returns on Treasury bonds along with 
presidencies, it will be carried out a mean-variance approach using an OLS regression 
with dummy variables. This regression is computed using the long term Treasury bonds 
total returns (LTR), but also with excess returns on three month Treasury bill and 
inflation. The first and principal regression specification is: 
tttt eRPDMLTR ++= −− 1211 ββ                 (1) 
The variable LTR stands for the returns on long-term Treasury bonds, and RP 
and DM are the constructed dummy variables, in which RP assumes 1 if on that quarter 
is a Republican President and 0 if it is Democratic, while DM assumes exactly the 
opposite values. The coefficients for β1 and β2 correspond to the average returns for 
Democrats and Republicans respectively. The explanatory variable is lagged, because 
the political decisions are expected to influence interest rate markets with some delay. 
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This methodology only captures the evolution of the total returns in absolute 
form, but for a more precise analysis, the evolution of excess returns should be 
investigated. One can apply the same equation to the two types of excess returns 
defined, first with excess returns on three month Treasury bill:  
ttttt eRPDMTBLLTR ++=− −− 1211 ββ                              (2) 
and secondly excess returns calculated over inflation:  
ttttt eRPDMINFLTR ++=− −− 1211 ββ                              (3) 
These three equations presented provide the starting and principal results for the 
analysis, because, in case of having differences in these values, there is an historically 
disparity between Republicans and Democrats. After these regressions, other tests are 
performed to increase the robustness of the previous results. Using the same 
methodological approach as before, tests can be made to sub-samples to confirm the 
previous results, and at the same time helping to distinguish and find possible different 
trends within the overall sample.  
The list of Presidents was obtained from the White House web page, and for 
cycle definition it was assumed that the presidential cycles started at the signature day. 
In case of the existence of two presidents in the same quarter, it was assumed that the 
person with more time within the quarter ran the entire quarter. The cycle could also be 
defined with the election date, yet, for this type of returns, the difference in cycle 
definitions is too small to produce considerable changes in interest rate markets and 
influence final results. The main quantitative variables used are LTR, TBL, and INF, 
and all of them were obtained from the database available at Prof. Amit Goyal webpage. 
LTR is based on the Ibbotson Yearbook series; TBL is based in NBER macro history 
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data base until 1933, and from 1933 to 2007 it is obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Bank at St. Louis (FRED); INF is retrieved from Consumer Price Index (All urban 
Consumers) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The statistical descriptions,  
Presidential cycles definition, and Dummy Variable descriptions are present in 
Appendix - Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3.  
III – Main Findings 
a) Overall Results 
Using the full sample of quarterly returns, since 1926 to 2008, in which there are 
169 quarters with Democrat presidency and 159 for Republican presidencies, there are 
high differences in long term Treasury bond returns between Democrats and 
Republicans. The average return for Republican presidencies is 1,969 percent  per 
quarter, twice as much as for Democrat presidencies, which have 0,849 percent per 
quarter in average. This implies that the average per year during Republican 
Administrations is 7,876 percent and during Democratic Administrations is 3,360 
percent. This is in line with what was expected ,because Democratic presidencies are 
linked with more inflation and higher GDP growth, and on the other hand Republicans 
prefer low inflation and lower interest rates and taxes, which favor the investment on 
bonds. The difference of the two values being equal to zero is rejected, so there is 
statistical evidence for high differences on the returns between the two parties. This 
disparity is even higher when the difference between the excess returns over three 
month T-bill is verified. In this test, during Democratic cycles the quarterly return was 
0,105 percent (0,42 percent per year), and these values are not statistically different from 
zero, while Republicans have 0,834 percent on a quarterly basis (3,33 percent per year). 
Once again, statistically, the two averages are different from each other, but the 
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quarterly standard deviations of the coefficients are quite similar, 0,315 percent for 
Democrats and 0,357 percent for Republicans on a quarterly basis. As to excess returns 
on inflation, the results are again higher in Republican Administrations, because both 
average returns are statistically different from zero, and Republicans present 1,830 
percent (7,320 percent annually), and Democrats present 0,606 percent (2,424 percent 
annually). All the values presented, statistical tests, and computational definitions for 
regressions are presented in Appendix – Table 4. 
In conclusion, there is statistical evidence that the Treasury bond returns are 
different within political cycles. With this outcome, investors directly or indirectly see in 
Republican presidencies conditions to add more financial gains to their bond 
investments. Normally, Government debt is seen as riskless, or at least as a financial 
investment with less risk. However, it is possible that differences in returns may be just 
a consequence of the increased risk from Republican presidencies. Other feasible 
explanation to the differences found is the type of policies followed by the governments. 
In this case the party in power is really important to the investor’s decision, considering 
that these policies have different consequences depending on the investments and 
investor types. While the impacts of the political decisions on stock markets can affect 
market prices more rapidly (for instance news about different government actions can 
have an anticipated impact on stock indexes), on the other hand, the decisions on 
Government debt emissions, interest rates fixation, and inflation control policies, which 
are more likely to affect fixed income investors, have a much slower impact on debt 
market prices. Finally, results are coherent to the economic premises and with previous 




b) Tests in subsamples 
As stated above, to consign more assurance to the overall results, tests in sub-
samples will be executed in order to confirm the evolution of  results in different 
periods. The overall sample was divided in two subsamples, the first one ranges from 
1926:Q1 to 1961:Q4, which translates into 144 observations after adjustments, with 82 
quarters for Democrats and 61 quarters for Republicans. The second sub-sample ranges 
from 1962:Q1 to 2007:Q4, including 184 observations, with 76 quarters for Democrats 
and 108 quarters with Republicans in presidency. This division is set to split the sample 
in two parts, according to different periods in the 20
th
 century, because while the first 
has significant history and economic marks like 1929 Depression, the World War II, and 
the Economic Boom of the 50’s, the second subsample is more stable, with only the 
Vietnam war as a significant U.S. historical  mark. Naturally, there were also some 
important shocks, like the oil shocks and the Cold War, but it was a period with higher 
economic growth and with characteristics that favored the investment in financial assets. 
 For the first sub-sample and starting with the long-term Treasury bond returns, 
Republican Administrations still present higher average returns, 0,921 percent (3,0684 
percent) compared with 0,724 percent (2,896 percent annually) on Democratic 
Administrations. Yet, these averages are statistically not different from each other, and 
so, there were no real differences in long-term returns in this period. For the second sub-
sample, the difference not only is statistically different from zero, but also the behavior 
of long-term bonds returns during Republican presidencies is exceedingly positive. For 
Republicans the returns in this period were 2,576 percent (10,304 percent annually), 
while for Democratic Presidencies it is only 0,982 percent (3,928 percent annually). It is 
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during this second period that the major difference between the two parties is 
established.  
Regarding excess returns on T-bill, one surprising result happens in the first sub-
sample. Unlike in total returns analysis, Democrats have higher excess returns on short-
term T-bill from 1926 to 1961. In this period the average for Republicans cycles is 1,264 
percent per year, while for Democrats is 2,272 percent per year. This is the only time in 
all analysis that the difference in returns was higher during Democrat cycles, but 
statistically, both averages for the two parties are not different from zero. In the second 
sub-sample, Republican cycles present a very good excess return on short-term T-bill, 
with 1,134 percent (4,536 percent annually), and Democrat cycles had a negative return 
with –0,387 percent (-1,548 percent annually). Though, this last value is not statistically 
different from zero, which is in line with the overall results for the excess returns on T-
bill. As to excess returns on inflation, the results once again are in line with the results 
obtained until now. In the first subsample, there is a difference of –0,521 percent 
between the two average returns that is not statistically different from zero. The results 
change in the second sub-sample because the quarterly difference is now –1,577 percent, 
a value that is statistically different from zero, so once again Treasury bond returns are 
higher during Republican presidencies. Concluding, tests in sub-samples attested 
generally the overall result using periods with different economic conditions that could 
influence the results. The major conclusion is that the source of the difference in returns 
is more established in the second part of the century. In the first part there were 
differences in returns but were not very high or statistically meaningful. The second part 
of the analyzed period favored more investors, which had a debt market with more 
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liquidity, more debt issuing, and other conditions favorable to the investment in fixed 
income securities, allowing to highlight the discrepancy in returns during Presidencies.  
c) Tests Using Other Control Variables 
 On the results presented until now, it is assumed that political cycles are 
independent from returns. However, returns may be correlated with other variables that 
can also influence the presidency cycles. To manage this possibility, variables that can 
impact on returns, should be controlled. In literature review, studies were presented 
showing that GDP growth is different during the two administrations with economic 
growth being much higher during Democrat presidencies. Taking this result in 
consideration,  the evolution of returns may be correlated with economic growth, 
implying that  the party in power might not directly affect returns. Also, different fiscal 
policies and Government expenditure decisions can alter the size of debt issued by 
Governments, and consequently impact on prices and bond returns. To control for 
economic growth, and expenditures it will be used quarterly real GDP growth, and 
Government expenditures growth, respectively. Both variables were obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) databases. Statistical description is available in 
Appendix – Table 1. Both variables are quarterly, however there is only data available 
starting 1947:Q3, so for the first 20 years, the impact of these variables will not be 
measured. The methodology used will be similar as before, and the regressions will be 
equal to equation (1), (2) and (3), but adding controls for GDP and Government 
expenditures: 
tttttt eEXPGDPRPDMLTR ++++= −−−− 12111211 ααββ   (4) 
 ttttttt eEXPGDPRPDMTBLLTR ++++=− −−−− 12111211 ααββ                (5) 
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ttttttt eEXPGDPRPDMINFLTR ++++=− −−−− 12111211 ααββ                (6) 
These equations will only be tested for two samples: first using all the new 
variables sample, 1947:Q3 to 2007:Q4, and next using the second sample, 1962:Q1 to 
2007:Q4. It is also in this second sample that previous results presented the major 
differences between the two parties, so the impact of these variables on final results, if 
significant, should be more meaningful in this sub-sample. Even when adding these two 
new control variables, results on the second sub-sample are very similar to the initial 
regressions, despite a small widening of the gap for the returns and excess returns on T-
bill. Regarding excess returns on inflation, the difference decreases (-1,35 percent 
compared with –1,57 percent) but it is still significant. Finally GDP growth and Public 
expenditures growth are not statistically significant in all equations, so these variables 
do not have great impact on the explanation of long-term Treasury bond returns. Even 
so, controlling for these variables can be helpful to eliminate possible correlation 
between Presidency cycles and economic performances. However as seen before, the 
overall conclusions are not modified and there is even more assurance that the main 
results  encountered before are indeed considerable. 
Additionally other set of variables could be used to attest the conclusions, like 
the level of monetary aggregates, yield spreads, or other possible macroeconomic 
variables. Notwithstanding, the variables used in this work to control for financial and 
economic influence, directly or indirectly are related with other possible explanatory 
variables, and ultimately one is controlling for the other possible variables. Furthermore, 
by adopting excess returns over inflation, the influence of macroeconomic factors is 
previously eliminated, and the same logic applies to excess returns over T-bill for 
monetary policy factors. 
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d) Return and Risk   
Santa Clara and Valkanov in their work test for differences in risk during both 
Administrations since one of the possible explanations for higher excess returns on 
stock markets encountered is the higher risk assumed from investors, meaning that the 
stock investors perceive Republicans as more risky than Democrats. This possible 
explanation also holds for Government bond markets, and the result can also be justified 
by the level of interest rates, which is normally lower during Republicans, but still not 
withdrawing the possibility of having a risk premium embedded in the excess of returns. 
To measure the risk difference between the two parties, it will be used the same 
methodology as before, but in this case the dependent variable is the squared root of the 
difference of  to average of  total returns on long term Treasury bonds. So the regression 
held is:  
 tttt eRPDMVLT ++= −− 1211 ββ    (7) 








 −= LTRLTRVLT tt  
This methodology was also applied to excess returns on T-bills and inflation. 
With the results of this equation, a standard deviation for the returns can be calculated, 
because, the dummy variable gives the average of the squared deviations from the mean, 
which is the variance. Volatility, measured as the standard deviation is the squared root 
of the estimated dummy.  The results show that there are not significant differences in 
risk, because the squared root differences from the average deviations are not 
statistically different from each other. Even so, the calculated standard deviation of 
returns are higher in Republican mandates for the three types of returns. However the 
difference is not very high, and specially in the last part of the sample, differences in 
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volatility are very similar. Despite being an apparent evidence for higher volatility 
during Republican presidencies, when analyzed the period where differences in returns 
are higher, the volatilities estimations are not different from each other. This implies 
that the market does not anticipate a premium over Republican presidencies, and 
differences in risk are not the source for return discrepancy. The estimated results, data, 
and methodology are described in Annex – Table 6. 
e) Relationship between Stock Market Returns and Long-Term Bond Returns 
Whenever stock markets are not good investments, common sense states that 
investors should be driven to others more secure and return-safer, preferentially 
Treasury bonds. As mentioned before, it is showed empirically in other papers that stock 
markets behave better during Democratic presidencies, and in this work is shown that 
returns on T-bonds are in average better during Republican administrations. The results 
obtained in this paper are then coherent with previous research of the subject but using 
different assets. It must not be forgotten that stocks and bonds are driven by different 
factors other than political variables. Stocks normally follow earnings expectations, and 
company’s performances that are more related to the economic cycles, while bonds are 
more dependent on the monetary side, inflation and monetary levels. Using the LTR, 
and the CRSP index as proxy for stock market risks, the correlation coefficient between 
long-term returns and stock market is 0,119. Even with a low value, correlation is 
positive. So historically there is a positive correlation between long-term bond returns 
and stock market returns, which is not conclusive for the hypothesis of negative relation 





f) Limitations of this work and Further Research 
 Returns are a measure and depend on many factors. In this work it is 
investigated whether long term Treasury bond returns were different within the political 
cycles, using the long-term returns defined as in Ibbotson series. But, there are short-
term and long-term investors, and these results can vary for instance, if the holding 
period of the bond changes, or if the investment horizon and risk aversion are different 
from investor to investor. The variables chosen to justify this work are adequate and 
consistent, but there are also other aspects linked with monetary policy and the financial 
system that can matter to the analysis, for example, the person who runs the Federal 
Reserve (FED) and consequently the monetary policy. However, the objective of this 
work was to investigate if in both Republican and Democrat presidencies the return 
averages were different, and not to analyze every aspect that could influence the return 
on Government bonds.  
The methodology  used  in this work is actually very simple. Using regressions 
which only take dummy variables to distinguish the different political impacts on 
returns, and controlling for other variables that might influence shifts in returns, these 
equations help obtain good results for the proposed subject. Some robustness tests were 
performed assuming different samples, and other explanatory variables. Nevertheless, 
there can also be some problems with this methodology, because in this case the test 
assumes that the dummy variable is constant over the sample, and the significance tests 
applied to this value are subjected to this hypothesis. Though, it is possible to have 
changes in the level of the dummy that  are not influenced only by political tests, 
implying that the conclusions about the significance of the political dummies could be 
wrongly taken. This might be corrected by adding more control variables to justify the 
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changes in level of the dummies. In this work two were used (GDP and Government 
expenditures growth), but there are other variables that perhaps should be included, and 
omitting them can lead to erroneous results. The use of dummy variables to capture the 
effect of political cycles is not broadly accepted, and for instance there are different 
methodologies defended by Caporale and Gried (2005). To overcome this problem of 
unexplained jumps in the series wrongly attributed to the political variables, they present 
tests based on Bai and Perron methods, identifying the break points and the structural 
changes in the intercepts, applying then different confidence intervals for the 
significance tests on the dummy variables. There are also other critiques to the use of 
dummy variables to explain differences in qualitative variables. In their paper Powell, 
Shi, Smith and Whaley (2005) alert to the problem of data mining in explanatory 
variables, stating that dummy variables are persistent through time and can suffer from 
autocorrelation, turning the results of the regressions spurious and with the significance 
of the regressor wrongly accepted. They use simulations of stock market returns against 
a series of independent simulated dummy variables, and they conclude that there is no 
evidence of  difference in stock returns between parties since the mid 1800’s.   
 In the development of this work, the relationship between the long-term Treasury 
bond returns and the party controlling in Congress (Senate and House of 
Representatives) was also tested. A priori, testing this relationship is interesting because 
major legislative and budget decisions are approved in Congress. The results were not 
significant because Democrats were in majority in Congress for most part of the time 
(252 quarters) compared to Republicans (72 quarters), and the statistical results were not 




IV – Concluding Remarks  
 This empirical work shows that the long-term Treasury bond returns are higher 
in Republican Administrations. This implies that, under Republicans the economy has 
higher probability of facing low interest rates and low inflation leading to higher returns 
on bonds. To sum up, the major conclusions from this work are: 
1. The average long term Treasury bond returns is significantly higher during 
Republican Administrations with an annually average returns of 7,876 percent 
(from 1926 to 2007), while this value for Democrat presidencies is 3,396 
percent. These differences are uphold for excess returns on inflation and three 
month T-bill. The conclusions are also supported with sub-sample tests. 
2. These differences between presidencies are still significant when controlling for 
macroeconomic factors (GDP growth and Government Expenditures Level). 
3. Excess returns on Republican Administrations are not explained by excess risk, 
meaning that values for standard deviations of returns are not distant for 
Democrats and Republicans.  
4. The findings in this work project are updated and coherent relatively to other 
empirical studies that test the similar relationships on other financial assets. 
5. The methodology used is simple, and not statistically complex, but gives valid 
results. Even with robustness tests, still, there is the possibility of presence of 
data mining, and possible autocorrelation on dummy variables. 
6. The results stated on this work-project are based on historical data, and just by 
themselves do not help predict any future returns. They may be useful to 
distinguish policies followed by different administrations making possible to 
anticipate movements on Government debt markets.  
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VI – Appendix  
Table 1 – In this table are presented the statistical values for the quantitative variables used. The mean and standard 
deviation are presented in annualized percentages, and in brackets are these quarterly values in percentage points. It 
is also presented values for autocorrelation up to lag 4 (in quarters).    
LTR LTR-TBL LTR-INF
Mean  5.704   [1.426] 1.92   [0.481] 4.949   [1.237]
Standard Deviation 8.584   [4.292] 8.692   [4.346] 8.695   [4.347]
Autocorrelation: 
1 -0.052 -0.058 -0.044
2 0.029 0.020 0.033
3 0.107 0.104 0.108
4 0.013 0.005 0.015
GDP EXP
Mean  3.227   [0.807] 2.417   [0.604]






Table 1 - Economic and Financial Variables
 
 
Table 2 – In this table are presented the list of Presidents, and the party in presidency that were considered in this 
work. The dates represent signature days, so it is considered a cycle when the presidency officially starts and not on 
election dates.  
Republican/Democrat Mandate Start Mandate End
Calvin Coolidge R 02-08-1923 04-03-1929
Herbert Hoover R 04-03-1929 04-03-1933
F.D. Roosevelt D 04-03-1933 12-04-1945
Harry Truman D 12-04-1945 20-01-1953
Dwight Eisenhower R 20-01-1953 20-01-1961
John Kennedy D 20-01-1961 22-11-1963
Lyndon Johnson D 22-11-1963 20-01-1969
Richard Nixon R 20-01-1969 09-08-1974
Gerald Ford R 09-08-1974 20-01-1977
Jimmy Carter D 20-01-1977 20-01-1981
Ronald Reagan R 20-01-1981 20-01-1989
George Bush R 20-01-1989 20-01-1993
Bill Clinton D 20-01-1993 20-01-2001
George W. Bush R 20-01-2001 20-01-2009







Table 3 –  Presidential cycles distribution by Republicans and Democrats (in quarters).  
Presidency 1926:Q1 - 2007:Q4 1926:Q1 - 1961:Q4 1962:Q1 - 2007:Q4
Republicans 159 83 76
Democrats 169 61 108
Total 328 144 184
Table 3 - Political Variables
 
 























































































Table 4:  This table presents the values for regressions (1), (2) and (3). DM and RP are the explanatory variables. The first horizontal line, for DM and RP set is the 
coefficient value of the regression, the second line value is the standard deviation of the coefficient estimation, and the last line value in parenthesis is the p-value for 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. 2R is the adjusted R
2 for the regressions. All regressions were calculated using OLS with Newey West 
estimator corrections for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Diff is represents the difference of the two coefficients (DM-RP). The values in this subset are result 
for the Wald Tests on coefficient restrictions. The first value is the absolute difference, the below value is the standard deviation of the difference, the value in 
parenthesis is the p-value for the F-test, and the p-value in brackets is the value for the Chi-Square test. Both tests are used to test the significance under the null 
hypothesis, that the difference in the coefficients is equal to zero. 
LTR LTR-TBL LTR-INF LTR LTR-TBL LTR-INF LTR LTR-TBL LTR-INF 
DM 0.849 0.105 0.606 0.724 0.568 0.493 0.982 -0.387 0.726
0.303 0.315 0.262 0.221 0.226 0.227 0.582 0.602 0.504
(0.054) (0.738) (0.021) (0.001) (0.0131) (0.032) (0.093) (0.52) (0.151)
RP 1.969 0.834 1.83 0.921 0.316 1.014 2.576 1.134 2.304
0.357 0.357 0.372 0.351 0.360 0.375 0.518 0.524 0.519
(0.000) (0.02) (0.000) (0.009) (0.381) (0.007) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000)
N
0.014 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.016 0.014 0.015
Diff -1.120 -0.728 -1.225 -0.197 0.252 -0.521 -1.594 -1.521 -1.577
0.468 1.919 0.453 0.415 0.425 0.445 0.779 0.468 0.704
(0.017) (0.232) (0.007) (0.6358) (0.554) (0.243) (0.042) (0.468) (0.026)
[0.016] [0.233] [0.006] [0.6351] [0.553] [0.241] [0.040] [0.016] [0.025]
Table 4 - Results
328 144 184










Table 5: This table presents the results from equations (4) ,(5) and (6). The methodology and results exhibit  is similar to the regression in table 4. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
LTR LTR-TBL LTR-INF LTR LTR-TBL LTR-INF 
DM 0.382 -0.631 0.536 0.777 -0.387 0.546
0.923 0.967 0.563 0.632 0.663 0.931
(0.3684) (0.514) (0.341) (0.220) (0.559) (0.558)
RP 2.462 0.957 1.894 2.126 0.855 2.168
0.619 0.638 0.466 0.460 0.469 0.628
(0.000) (0.1359) (0.001) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000)
GDP 8.625 22.054 -0.587 -0.910 2.558 15.161
-22.147 57.442 27.51 29.526 31.266 54.722
(0.697) (0.701) (0.983) (0.9754) (0.934) (0.782)
EXP 12.240 7.103 -0.993 -0.787 0.314 8.794
54.188 22.262 6.89 7.571 7.463 22.194
(0.822) (0.750) (0.885) (0.917) (0.966) (0.692)
N
0.007 0.021 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.006
Diff -1.629 -1.588 -1.35 -1.348 -1.243 -1.622
0.853 0.875 0.639 0.668 0.0682 0.86
(0.057) (0.714) (0.034) (0.044) (0.069) (0.061)
[0.056] [0.069] [0.033] [0.43] [0.068] [0.059]
184 242
Table 5 - Results







Table 6: Estimated values relative to equation (7). The dependent variables are VTL (total returns), VTL2 (excess returns on T-bill), and VTL3(excess returns on 
inflation). All estimations were performed using OLS and Newey-West estimators to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity on residuals. 2R is the adjusted 
R2 for the regressions. The first horizontal lines are the coefficient estimated for the average of squared deviations from the mean values. Diff is the difference between 
the coefficients (DM-RP), The values in this subset are result for the Wald Tests on coefficient restrictions. The first value is the absolute difference, the below value is 
the standard deviation of the difference; the value in parenthesis is the p-value for the F-test, and the value in brackets is the p-value for the Chi-Square test. Both tests 
are used to test the significance under the null hypothesis, that the difference in the coefficients is equal to zero. On the last part of the table are presented the volatility 
values based on the estimations. The first values are the squared roots of the coefficients yielding the quarterly volatility, while the last two lines represent the 
annualised values for volatility (quarterly standard deviation annualization factor square-root of 4). 
 
VTL VTL2 VTL3 VTL VTL2 VTL3 VTL VTL2 VTL3
DM 14.885 19.029 15.421 4.45 5.969 5.086 25.998 32.963 26.426
3.922 4.19 3.871 1.303 1.186 1.234 6.996 13.048 11.028
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.017)
RP 21.744 22.67 22.174 7.819 10.514 7.953 29.812 29.713 30.414
3.540 2.950 3.570 1.499 2.236 1.878 5.934 4.715 6.056
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.017 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
Diff -6.858 -3.64 -6.753 -3.369 -4.544 -2.866 -3.813 3.222 -3.988
5.286 5.129 5.266 1.986 2.672 2.252 9.174 13754 12.602
(0.195) (0.478) (0.200) (0.092) (0.091) (0.205) (0.678) (0.815) (0.752)
[0.194] [0.477] [0.1998] [0.0899] [0.081] [0.203] [0.677] [0.814] [0.7517]
DM 3.858 4.362 3.927 2.110 2.443 2.255 5.099 5.741 5.141
RP 4.663 4.761 4.709 2.796 3.243 2.820 5.460 5.451 5.515
DM 7.716 8.724 7.854 4.219 4.886 4.510 10.198 11.483 10.281
RP 9.326 9.523 9.418 5.592 6.485 5.640 10.920 10.902 11.030
328 144 184
Volatility
Table 6 - Risk Analysis Results 
1926:Q1 - 2007:Q4 1926:Q1 - 1961:Q4 1962:Q1 - 2007:Q4
2
R
